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I. Introduction
Since France first introduced the consumption tax in 1954, many 
countries have adopted it and increased their own consumption tax rate 
(e.g., in Sweden, the standard tax rate increased from 11.11% to 25% 
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In this study, we examine the effect of consumption tax on the 
growth rate and welfare in a model with money and endogenous 
fertility. First, we show that an increase in consumption tax always 
reduces the economic growth rate but has an ambiguous effect on 
welfare. We show a numerical example based on Japanese data 
and demonstrate the likelihood that increasing the consumption tax 
decreases welfare. We also compare the effects of consumption tax 
financing and monetary financing on growth rate and welfare.
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between 1969 and 1992; in Germany from 10% to 19% between 1968 
and 2006; and in Japan from 3% to 8% between 1989 and 2014). One 
of the main reasons for raising the consumption tax rate is to maintain 
the social security system. Thus, analyzing the long-term consequences 
of a change in consumption policy is important. One of the 
justifications for the increase is that consumption tax is thought to be 
less distortionary than other kinds of taxes. Indeed, in a representative 
agent model without labor-leisure choice, many theoretical arguments 
predict consumption tax has no distortionary effect on economic growth 
and welfare (see Schenone 1975; Abel and Blanchard 1983; Itaya 
1991; Rebelo 1991; Pecorino 1993). However, several authors indicate 
situations where the neutrality of consumption tax does not hold. 
Matsuzaki (2003) finds that imposing a consumption tax may decrease 
or increase effective demand according to the ratio of poorer households 
to all households. Futagami and Doi (2004) also find a positive effect 
of commodity taxes on economic growth because an increase in 
commodity tax rates reduces the demand for consumption goods and 
reallocates labor from the production of goods to R&D activities. Chang 
(2006) finds that if households accumulate capital not only for future 
consumption but also for social status, a rise in the consumption tax 
enhances the steady-state level of capital stock and consumption. 
Kaneko and Matsuzaki (2009) examine the effect of a consumption tax 
on economic growth using an overlapping generations (OLG) model with 
money holdings and show that the neutrality of the consumption tax 
does not hold in the money-in-the-utility-function model, but holds in 
the cash-in-advance and money-in-the-production- function models. 
However, no paper has noted the influence of a change in consumption 
tax on economic growth in a monetary model with endogenous fertility.
Many studies have attempted to explain a household’s fertility 
decision in theoretical models. Literature reveals several important 
roles of fertility in economic growth. For example, works by Becker 
et al. (1990), Fan (1997), Tabata (2003), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), and 
Kaneko et al. (2016) provide theoretical explanations for the continuous 
decline in fertility rate in most developed countries. Other researchers 
investigate the relationship between economic take-off and households’ 
fertility choices (e.g., Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Mountford 2008). 
In contrast to existing literature, our research points out the effect of a 
change in tax policy, a change in the consumption tax in this case on 
the change in fertility. In other words, we show the hidden consequence 
357The effecT of The consumpTion Tax on economic GrowTh
of this policy change on the growth rate and welfare.
In the subsequent discussion, we first show that an increase in 
consumption tax increases the fertility rate and decreases economic 
growth. The following mechanism explains this result. As the rate 
of consumption tax increases, the relative price of having a child 
decreases, and the fertility rate increases. In the representative agent 
model, parents distribute assets equally among children, which deters 
the capital accumulation of each household. Though this result is 
rather straightforward, in the process of generating it, we derived the 
important fact that the cost of having a child includes the level of 
money holding.
After revealing the non-neutrality of consumption tax on economic 
growth, our paper considers the effect on welfare. Contrary to the 
result for economic growth, the effect of consumption tax on welfare 
is ambiguous; it depends on the current monetary policy (specifically, 
the monetary growth rate). This is true because two opposing effects 
of the increase in the consumption tax on welfare exist. The first 
is the growth effect, wherein an increase in the consumption tax 
reduces economic growth, although it works negatively on welfare. 
The second is the fertility effect, wherein the increase in consumption 
tax induces a household to have more children because the increase 
in the consumption tax raises the cost of consumption. Because 
households generate utility from the number of children, the fertility 
effect increases welfare. Interestingly, the magnitude of the fertility 
effect depends on the current monetary policy, specifically the growth 
rate of the money supply. The reason is explained as follows. When the 
monetary authority demonstrates an expansionary monetary policy 
(i.e., the money supply has a high growth rate), the household reduces 
its money holdings relative to capital to avoid the cost of inflation. This 
reduction causes an increase in fertility because the cost of having 
a child becomes smaller (remember that the cost of having a child 
includes the level of money holding). In turn, this increase makes the 
negative growth effect superior to the positive fertility effect because the 
high fertility rate implies the marginal utility of having an additional 
child is low. We provide a numerical analysis based on Japanese data 
and show its likelihood of increasing the consumption tax decreases 
welfare.
In the following analysis, we compare the relative effectiveness of 
consumption tax and monetary financing. Chang et al. (2013) show 
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that the superneutrality of money does not hold in the presence of 
endogenous fertility. Therefore, determining which is more efficient in 
terms of raising the same economic growth and welfare level is natural.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II proposes the 
fundamental model. Section III analyzes the effect of the consumption 
tax on economic growth and welfare. Section IV compares effects of 
consumption tax financing and monetary financing on the growth rate 
and welfare. The last section provides a conclusion to the study.
II. The Model 
A single good can be used for consumption, investment, and raising 
children. Production of the good is carried out by a representative 
household that operates the AK technology a la Rebelo (1991):
 y = Ak, (1)
where y is the per capita real output, A is the technology level, and k is 
the per capita real capital stock.
The representative household decides how much to consume, 
how much to save, and how many children to have. Households can 
accumulate two types of assets: money and capital. The representative 
household’s real budget constraint is written as
 ṁ  + k̇  = y – πm – (m + k)n – (1 + τc )c – qn + τ, (2)
where m is the per capita real money holdings, π is the inflation rate, n 
is the rate of fertility, τc  is the consumption tax rate, c is the per capita 
consumption, q is the cost of child bearing per a child, and τ is the 
per capita lump-sum transfer. A dot indicates a time derivative. We 
assume that q = q―k, where q― is a fixed value to keep the cost of child 
bearing meaningful in a growing economy, as in Chang et al. (2013). 
The term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (2), – (m + k)n, shows the 
wealth reduction due to having new children because the representative 
household should reallocate its assets for new-born children. Chang et 
al. (2013) call this reduction in total assets the wealth-narrowing effect 
of newborn children.
The representative household gains utility from consumption, the 
amount of money holdings, and the number of children. The household 
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where α is a preference parameter measuring the desire for fertility 
relative to consumption, β is preference parameter for money holdings, 
and ρ is the subjective discount rate. We assume α > 0 and β > 0. Note 
that the utility of money holdings is formed by the purchasing power 
of money, which is represented by m/(1 + τc ). The representative agent 
derives its utility from raising children emotionally in line with Palivos 
(1995), Yip and Zhang (1997), and Chang et al. (2013). We employ a 
representative agent model with a fertility choice to exclude any effects 
from heterogeneity among agents. The specification of utility function is 
compatible with balanced growth with a constant fertility rate.
Let λ be the co-state variable and using (2) and (3), we have the 
necessary conditions for our optimal control problem as follows:
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 λ(A – n – q―n) = – λ̇ + λρ. (7)
(4)–(6) represent the equality of the marginal utility of consumption, 
having a child, and money holding to the cost of each. It is worth noting 
that the term in the brackets on the RHS of (5), m + k, reflects the 
wealth-narrowing effect. (7) is a standard Euler equation that dictates 
the growth rate of the shadow value of wealth, λ̇/λ. The transversality 
condition must also be satisfied as the following necessary condition:
 lim 0, lim 0.
t t
t t
ke meρ ρλ λ− −
→∞ →∞
= =  
(8)
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Substituting λ in (4) into (5) gives
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(9)
The left-hand side of (9) indicates the marginal rate of substitution of 
consumption for having a child. The RHS shows the relative price of 
goods in terms of the number of children. Note that the price of having 
a child includes the level of money holdings. It reflects the wealth-
narrowing effect of newborn children. Applying λ given by (4) and λ̇ + λρ 
in (6) to (7) yields
 
(1 ) .c c A qn
m
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(10)
The consolidated government can determine the growth rate of the 
money supply, μ, and the consumption tax rate independently. Newly 
issued money and tax revenue are transferred to each household 
equally in a lump-sum. Thus, the per capita lump-sum transfer is 
expressed as follows:
 τ = μm + τc c. (11)
We write the money market equilibrium condition as Ms ≡ pmN  where 
p is the general price level, Ms is the nominal money supply, and N is 









Introducing π given by (10) into (12), we obtain
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Substituting τ in (11) and ṁ  in (12) into (2) gives
 k̇  = Ak – (1 + q―)nk – c. 
(14)
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The above is the dynamic equation for capital accumulation. Combining 
(4) and (7) yields
 ,









or the Euler equation for per-capita consumption.
To derive the autonomous dynamic system, we define the transformed 
variable χ ≡ c/k and z ≡ m/k. From (13), (14), and (15), the autonomous 
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The balanced growth path (BGP) is the situation in which all real 
variables grow at the same constant rates. We illustrate that the 
transversality condition is satisfied at the BGP equilibrium and the BGP 
equilibrium is totally unstable in the Appendix. Thus, no transitional 
process exists in this model as in the standard AK-type endogenous 
growth model.
III. Analysis
On the BGP, c, k, and m grow at the same rate. Thus, χ̇ /χ = ż/z = 0. 
This fact, (16), and (17) yield
 






where an asterisk over a variable represents its BGP value. From (9), we 
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A. Effect of a Change in Consumption Tax on Economic Growth
Differentiating (19) with respect to τc gives the effect of a change in 
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(20)
The terms in the large bracket on the RHS of (20) show two effects 
of an increase in consumption tax rate on the fertility rate. The first 
term in bracket, 1 shows the direct effect of the tax on the price of 
consumption, which is households always prefer having children to 
consumption. The second term in the bracket is the indirect effect of 
consumption tax through a change in money holdings. As mentioned in 
the argument below (9), the cost of having a child includes the level of 












This result indicates that an increase in consumption tax increases z*, 
the ratio of money holdings to capital stock and reflects the fact that 
households increase money holdings in response to the reduction in 
purchasing power caused by an increase in the consumption tax. Thus, 
the indirect effect in (20) works negatively on the fertility rate.
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(22)
Though the direct and indirect effects affect the fertility rate in opposite 
directions, (22) means the direct effect is always superior to the indirect 
effect in our model. 
1 Specifically, it is a change in z, the ratio of money holdings to capital stock, 
not a change in m that influences the fertility rate, as in (20). However, because 
of the usual property of the endogenous growth model, the ratio of consumption 
to capital stock is fixed, as in the first equation (18). Thus, we can express the 
indirect effect by z.
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Lemma. An increase in the consumption tax leads to an increase in 
fertility rate.
We move on to investigate the effect of consumption tax on economic 
growth. In the BGP equilibrium, the level of capital, money holdings, 
and consumption grow at the same constant rate. Let g denote the 
steady growth rate. The growth rate of consumption itself can represent 
the BGP growth rate, g. Differentiating the entire RHS of (15) on the 







= − + <
 
(23)
The inequality directly follows from the lemma. Formally, we state 
that 
Proposition 1. An increase in consumption tax decreases the growth 
rate in monetary economy under the endogenous fertility model.
As the lemma shows, an increase in the consumption tax always 
increases the fertility rate. This increases the child bearing cost and 
wealth-narrowing effect. Therefore, capital accumulation and economic 
growth are deterred.2
B. Effect of a Change in the Consumption Tax on Welfare 
In the following analysis, we consider the effect of a change in 
consumption tax on welfare. Our model has no transitional process and 
we need to focus only on a BGP to calculate welfare change caused by 
changes in the tax rate. On the BGP, (18) holds, and the values of c and 
m can be related to the value of k, as below:
2 Some papers point out the positive relationship between the population 
growth rate and economic growth (e.g., Jones 2001). In these studies, a larger 
population stimulates idea production and enhances economic growth. In our 
paper, we employ Ak-type technology and such a positive mechanism does not 
emerge. In other words, the time span in our study is shorter than those of 
previous works.
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Using (14), (18), and the fact that the fertility rate is constant on a BGP, 
we can rewrite the dynamic equation for capital accumulation as
 k̇  = Ak – (1 + q―)n*k – ρk. 
(25)
Defining the initial value of capital stock as k(0), the solution of the 
above equation is
 k(t) = k(0)e g *t, 
(26)
where g* ≡ A – (1 + q―)n* – ρ.3
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All variables except for time inside of the integral are constant and we 
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By differentiating the above equation with respect to τc, we derive a 
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The first term on the RHS of (28) shows the growth effect of a 
household’s consumption and money holdings on the household’s utility 
level. The second term indicates the effect through a change in fertility, 
which we call the fertility effect. From the lemma and Proposition 1, we 
3 On a BGP, the growth rate of consumption per capita is equal to that of 
capital stock per capita, and thus we use the same notation, g*, for the growth 
rate of k on the BGP.
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know these effects work in opposite directions on welfare.
Applying n* in (9), z* in (18), and dn*/dτc in (22) to (28) yields
 * 2
1 1(1 )(1 ) .




τ ρ µ ρ τ
 + +
= − + + + + + + + +   
(29)
From the terms in the large brackets on the RHS of (29), we have the 
following proposition.
Proposition 2. An increase in consumption tax rate decreases 
(increases) welfare when μ > (<) – ρ{q―β + [1 + q―(1 + β)]τc }/(1 + q
―)[β + (1 + β) 
τc ].
The sign of dU/dτc  is negative (positive) if and only if 
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As μ can be negative or positive, the condition above suggests whether 
an increase in the consumption tax increases depends on the value of 
μ (i.e., monetary policy). The effect of consumption tax depends on the 
money growth rate for the following reason. A higher level of μ causes 
the household to reduce its money holdings relative to capital to avoid 
the opportunity cost of holding money and the nominal interest rate. 
This reduction causes an increase in fertility as the relative price of 
having a child decreases. When the fertility rate is high, the marginal 
utility of the fertility rate is low.4 Therefore, the positive fertility effect is 
inferior to the negative growth effect on welfare in (28) and the increase 
in consumption tax decreases a household’s welfare level.
C. Numerical Example
Based on the Bank of Japan (2017) data, the growth rate of M2 in 
Japan is µ = 0.0269 on average from 1995 to 2015. Thus, according to 
Proposition 2, an increase in a consumption tax reduces welfare.
We demonstrate a numerical example to look at how low the 
monetary expansion rate should be for an increase in consumption tax 
4 Note that α/n* on RHS of (28) indicates the marginal utility of having a child.
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to raise welfare. To show the relationship between policy variables, μ, 
and τc in (30), we need the values of β, ρ, and q
―. According to existing 
studies (e.g., Holman 1998 and Chang et al. 2013), we set the values of 
preference for money holdings, β, and the subjective discount rate, ρ, 
as 0.02 and 0.04, respectively. To derive q―, we use equation (15). Once 
we have the growth rate of consumption, the technology level, A, and 
fertility rate, n, we can derive q―.
From the World Bank (2017) data, during 1995–2015 in Japan, we 
find the average annual consumption per GDP, c/y, is 0.5696, the 
fertility rate is approximately 0.0068, and the annual growth rate of 
consumption per capita is 0.0083. During most of the period, Japan 
set the consumption tax rate at 5%. Remember that χ defines c/k. 
Substituting k in (1) into the first equation of (18) gives A = ρ/(c/y). We 
set ρ as 0.04 and we can calculate A as 0.0702. Note that the growth 
rate of consumption equals g. Applying the values of ρ, g, n, and A, 
which we derived above, to (15) yields q― = 2.2206. Using the above 
values of τc, µ, n, β, ρ, and q
― in (19) gives α = 0.5235.
Using β = 0.02, ρ = 0.04, and q― = 2.2206, we can illustrate the 
threshold value of the growth rate of the money supply to any value of 
τc in Proposition 2 as in Figure 1. The shaded area in Figure 1 is where 
the increasing consumption tax decreases welfare.
Recently in Japan, there has been a debate regarding whether 
the consumption tax should increase for fiscal reform or whether it 





























Threshold Value of The GrowTh raTe of Money supply
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Based on our model, the monetary policy should be extremely tight, 
that is, µ < 0.037, for the increase in the consumption tax to increase 
welfare.
IV.  Growth and Welfare Effects of Different Financing 
Methods
In the argument above, we reveal the non-neutrality of consumption 
tax and its effect on the growth rate and welfare through a change in 
the fertility rate. As Chang et al. (2013) confirm, the super-neutrality of 
money does not hold in the presence of endogenous fertility. Here, we 
compare the growth and welfare effects of an increase in consumption 
tax with those of an increase in monetary expansion rate to raise the 
government’s revenue by the same amount. We call an increase in 
government expenditure using only the consumption tax, consumption 
tax financing and an increase in government expenditure using only 
monetary expansion, monetary financing. To tackle this issue, we 
assume that government revenue τ is represented as τ–k, where τ– is a 
fixed value and compare the growth and welfare effects of consumption 
tax financing and monetary financing for a certain change in τ–.
We rewrite the government budget constraint (11) as
 τ– = μz + τc χ.
Remember that the ratio of consumption to capital stock χ is fixed on 
the BGP in (18) and no transitional process exists. Thus, increased 
government expenditure must be financed by satisfying the following 
equation:
 dτ– = μdz* + z*dμ + ρdτc . (31)
In general, the responses of the BGP level of key variables in our model, 
such as z*, n*, g* and U *, to a change in the government expenditure 
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First, we consider consumption tax financing. In this case, dµ = 0 
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By setting dµ = 0 and using (34), (35), (36), and (37), we can calculate 
the effect on growth rate and welfare level from consumption tax 
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Next, we consider monetary financing. In this case, a change in 
consumption tax rate should be zero, that is, dτc = 0. Thus, based on (31) 
and (32), we have the following equations: 
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Using (31), (34), (35), and (41), we can calculate the effect on growth rate 
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Now, we can compare the effects of different financing methods on 
the growth rate and the welfare level. First, by comparing (38) and (42), 
we can derive the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. Monetary financing is more favorable than consumption 
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We can use the numerical values that we derived in subsection 
C to depict the condition in Figure 2. The horizontal axis indicates 
the monetary expansion rate ranging from -0.035 to 1. The current 
consumption tax rate in Japan is 0.08 and we can conclude that 
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monetary financing is more favorable than consumption tax financing 
in terms of the growth rate.
Basically, the condition in (44) reflects the effects of different 
expenditure financing on fertility rate. (34) indicates a change in growth 
rate is determined totally by a change in fertility rate. Indeed, the 
condition in (44) is exactly the same as a condition that describes the 
relative effect of different financing options on fertility rate. By using the 
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(45)
The numerical result reflects that consumption tax financing increases 
the fertility rate more than monetary financing does in our numerical 
example.
As for welfare, we compare the change in welfare level caused by 
each financing method numerically. We depict the results in Figure 3 
of setting τc = 0.08. Specifically, the vertical axis indicates the level of 
change in welfare caused by each financing method, dU */dτ–|dμ = 0 and 
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Figure 2
relaTionship beTween The Threshold Value and acTual of consuMpTion  
Tax raTe
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μ, ranging from -0.035 to 0.1. The solid line corresponds to the level 
of dU */dτ–|dμ = 0 and the dotted line indicates the level of dU */dτ
–|dτc = 0. 
The figure indicates monetary financing decreases welfare more than 
consumption tax financing does in all regions.
By looking at (35) carefully, we can see the derivation of the above 
numerical results for the welfare in detail. (35) shows the effect of 
each financing method on welfare consists of the effects through the 
growth rate dg */dτ–, fertility rate, dn */dτ–, and monetary policy change, 
dμ/dτ–. As described in (44), monetary financing is less harmful than 
consumption tax financing in the terms of the growth rate. (40) and (45) 
indicate that consumption tax financing is more preferable for welfare 
than monetary financing in terms of dn */dτ– and dμ/dτ–. The result 
in Figure 3 shows the sum of the effect through the fertility rate and 
the monetary policy change exceeds the former and consumption tax 
financing is preferable in terms of welfare.
According to the above analysis, the Japanese government should not 
rely on consumption tax financing or monetary financing only because 
economic growth is an important political goal, as is the welfare of its 
people. To mitigate the trade-off in choosing between consumption tax 
financing and monetary financing, the government should adopt of mix 






Change in Welfare Level 
Figure 3
chanGe in welfare leVel
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V. Conclusions 
In this study, we examine the effects of consumption tax on 
endogenous growth rate and welfare under endogenous fertility in a 
monetary economy. Increasing the consumption tax rate lowers the 
growth rate on the BGP. An increase in consumption tax rate decreases 
(increases) welfare when the monetary expansion rate is relatively 
higher (lower). A higher monetary expansion rate leads to lower level of 
money holdings relative to capital and higher fertility rate. When the 
fertility rate is high, the marginal utility of the fertility rate is low. The 
positive fertility rate effect on welfare becomes inferior to the negative 
growth effect and an increase in the consumption tax rate decreases 
welfare when the monetary expansion rate is high.
Several extensions may be fruitful for future research. The first 
extension would be a more general form of utility. We use a log-linear 
utility function that helps us evaluate the effect of consumption tax 
analytically in our model. However, it is a restrictive model and worth 
re-investigating our argument under a more general utility function.
Second, we can analyze the government expenditure financing 
problem in our setting. Comparing the effects of different financing 
methods, such as a consumption tax and monetary financing, should 
reveal the optimal mix of financing methods for economic growth and 
welfare.
Third, a similar analysis can be conducted in an overlapping 
generations structure that houses a policy effect arising from 
heterogeneity (see Weil 1991; Kaneko and Matsuzaki 2009). To exclude 
these effects, we employ a representative agent model in the main 
analysis. If we conduct a similar analysis with an overlapping structure, 
the interaction of the effect we derived here with the existing effects 
emerges, and we suppose this interaction complicates the analysis. We 
would also find a richer relationship between a change in tax policy and 
economic growth and welfare than the one that we document in this 
research.
Finally, the monetary policy specification can be more realistic. We 
employ a simple monetary policy similar to Friedman’s k-percent rule. 
After the global financial crisis, monetary authorities in developed 
countries adopted unconventional monetary policy. Examining the 
relationship between the new policy and the effect of a tax policy would 
be fruitful. Future research should aim to address these aspects.
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Appendix: 
Transversality Condition and Stability of the Balanced 
Growth Equilibrium
To satisfy the transversality condition, (8), the differentiation in the 
present value of assets, λke–ρt and λme–ρt, with respect to time must be 
negative.
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Because (17) and (18) show that µ = β(1 + τc)ρ ⁄z – ρ  in the BGP 
equilibrium, the transversality conditions in (46) are satisfied.
We examine the dynamic property of the equilibrium. Linearizing 
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The trace, T, and the determinant, D, of the coefficient matrix from (47) 
is given by
 T = μ + 2χ* > 0,
 D = χ*(μ + χ*) > 0.
Thus, the coefficient matrix of (47) has two positive eigenvalues. Both χ 
and z are jumpable, the economy immediately jumps to its BGP and the 
BGP equilibrium is determinate.
(Received 18 October 2017; Revised 29 March 2018; Accepted 4 October 
2018)
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